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THE ENDURING EXAMPLE OF JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN:
"VIRTUE AS PRACTICE" IN THE SUPREME COURT*
WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE**

I. IN DISSENT ON THE WARREN COURT
Twenty years after his last term on the Supreme Court, whatever else
complimentary may be written of Justice John Marshall Harlan's sixteen

years on the Court (1955-1971), it ought not be said that, in the era of the
Warren Court,' he was a leading champion of civil liberties and of civil

rights. Rather, of Justice John Marshall Harlan it may more appropriately
be said that, in the era of the Warren Court, Justice Harlan was more

often than not in dissent. 2 Indeed, for those inclined to measure judges by
* Presented at the New York Law School Centennial Conference in Honor of Justice
John Marshall Harlan (Apr. 20, 1991). For other writings on Justice Harlan additional to
those in this conference issue, see THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY: SELECTED
OPINIONS AND PAPERS OF JUSTICE JOHN M. HARLAN (David L. Shapiro ed., 1969);
TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: GREAT DISSENTER OF THE WARREN

COURT (1992); Stephen M. Dane, "Ordered Liberty" and Sef-Restraint: The Judicial
Philosophy of the Second Justice Harlan, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 545 (1982); Drew S. Days
III, Justice John M. Harlan, 12 N.C. CENT. L.J. 250 (1981); Norman Dorsen, John
Marshall Harlan, in THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969,

at 2803 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969); Daniel A. Farber, Civilizing Public
Discourse: An Essay on ProfessorBickel, Justice Harlan, and the Enduring Significance
of Cohen v. California, 1980 DUKE L.J. 283; Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, Justice
Harlanand the FirstAmendment, 2 CONST. COMMENTARY 425 (1985); Henry J. Friendly,
Mr. Justice Harlan, As Seen by a Friend and Judge of an Inferior Court, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 382 (1971); Russell W. Galloway, Jr., The First Decade of the Burger Court:
Conservative Dominance (1969-1979), 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 891, 893 (1981); William
H. Ledbetter, Jr., Mr. Justice Harlan: Due Processand Civil Liberties, 20 S.C. L. REV.
389 (1968); Gary C. Leedes, The Revival of Interest in Justice Harlan's Flexible Due
ProcessBalancingApproach, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 737 (1982); Lewis I. Maddocks, The
Two Justice Harlans on Civil Rights and Liberties: A Study in Judicial Contrasts, 68 KY.
L.J. 301 (1979-80); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Justice Harlan, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 417
(1986).
** William R. & Thomas S. Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University.
1. The Court whose Chief Justice is remembered by his foremost biographer, Bernard
Schwartz, as "Super Chief," and whose leading champion, Justice William Brennan,
arriving a year after Harlan and staying on sixteen years afterwards, is now extolled as the
"Architect of the Bill of Rights." BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF EARL WARREN AND
HIS SUPREME COURT: A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY (1983); Laurence H. Tribe, Architect of the

Bill of Rights, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1991, at 47, 47.
2. See ALAN BARTH, PROPHETS WTH HONOR:

GREAT DISSENTS AND GREAT
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the extent of their contribution to "the idea of progress,"' insofar as the

Warren Court was the embodiment of that idea, then Justice John Marshall
Harlan may more suitably be known as the Justice who more often than
not threw sand into the churning cogwheels of the Warren Court. It was
Justice Brennan, and not Harlan, who helped oil the moving parts.

Consider the following brief review of four principal
categories of the
Warren Court civil rights-civil liberties enterprise. 4
A. Reapportionment Under Supreme Court Directive
In his own assessment of the era of the Warren Court, the Chief
Justice personally regarded the reapportionment decisions ("one person,
one vote") as the most consequential of all those rendered during his

sixteen years on the Supreme Court (1953-1969).' Yet, in both of the
seminal cases generating all of the subsequent downstream cases on
reapportionment, John Marshall Harlan demurred. In each of the two
"great" cases that launched the Court's reapportionment career, that is,
pursuant to his inability to fathom the majority's treatment of the
constitutional clauses that it thought somehow to be relevant and
controlling, Justice Harlan was in dissent. 6
B. The Second Reconstruction

Others believe that those cases falling into a second category were far
more consequential overall than the reapportionment cases in establishing
the principal civil rights pedigree of the Warren Court: cases on race and

racially related voting rights. Justice Harlan was not a member of the
DISSENTERS IN THE SUPREME COURT 41 (1974) (stating that Harlan, even more so than

Justice Holmes, genuinely deserved to be called the "Great Dissenter").
3. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS
12-13 (1970), in which Bickel suggests that the Warren Court did not remember the past
and imagine the future, but rather the Court "imagine[d] the past and remember[ed] the
future." Id. at 13. In other words, it decided what it wanted to have the Constitution do
according to its own vision and then made up its own history to deem it done.
4. Willfully omitted from this initial review of cases are others that will be examined
more particularly later on.
5. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 410.
6. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 330 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474, 486 (1968) (Harlan, I., dissenting); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S.
89, 97 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 20 (1964)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Court when the opening case, Brown v. Board ofEducation,7 was decided
in 1954. He was a member in 1966, however, when the Warren Court
held Virginia's poll tax to be unconstitutional as a denial of equal
protection! But instead of concurring in the majority's holding, Justice
Harlan disagreed with it; he thought nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment
reached a nonfederal poll tax per se.9 When, in 1966, the Warren Court
also upheld a special section of the 1965 Voting Rights Act disallowing
literacy tests in New York, thus enabling Puerto Ricans to vote though
unable to speak English, Harlan again demurred.1" So far as he could
determine, there was no constitutional basis for the Act. Also in 1966,
when the Warren Court reconstrued, applied, and sustained as
constitutional a Reconstruction act to reach racially motivated private
conspiracies against persons in travel, Harlan was unable to agree with the
majority." And in 1964, he again disassociated himself from the Warren
Court; insofar as the majority suggested that ordinary enforcement of state
trespass statutes at the instance of private entrepreneurs might violate the
Fourteenth Amendment per se, Harlan was respectfully in dissent. 12
In 1968, moreover, he found no warrant for the Warren Court view
that a century-old act of Congress did-or constitutionally could-reach
all private racial refusals to enter into property transfers. 3 So, there
again, he was unable to help oil the progressive machine. Nor did he
agree that a statewide referendum repeal of a state fair housing act,
coupled with a state constitutional prohibition on the enactment of
legislation affecting private decisions to sell or not sell, was forbidden by
the Fourteenth Amendment, as the majority of the Warren Court
believed. 4 Nor, in 1961, was it obvious to Justice Harlan how anything
adverted to in another Warren Court majority opinion satisfied Fourteenth
Amendment state action requirements in respect to a private, commercial
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
9. See id. at 680 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
10. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 659 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see
also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 152 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that Congress lacked the power to invalidate age-based voting
eligibility requirements); cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (ratified in 1971) ("The right of
citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years or older, to vote shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or any State on account of age.").
11. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 762 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
12. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 311 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
13. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 449 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
14. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 387 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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restaurant lessee's refusal of service in Wilmington, Delaware.15 Given
the state of the record, as he understood it, the most that Justice Harlan

believed to be 16warranted in this case was to remand the matter for further
consideration.

C. The Criminal Procedure Revolution
If a laggard on reapportionment by constitutional fiat (as he was), and

if not particularly activist on a number of race-related civil rights decisions
during this era (as evidently he wasn't), where else might Justice Harlan

have made a great substantive civil rights-civil liberties mark during these
heady years? A third category of civil rights-civil liberties advance during

the Warren Court years was assuredly that of criminal procedure and the
great expansion of rights of the criminally accused. The cases of the time
were sufficiently famous that several became eponymous in their own
right. Among the most famous were: Gideon v. Wainwright,1 1 Mapp
v.Ohio,"' Griffin v.

illinois,"9 Fay v. Noia,'

and Miranda v.

15. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S 715, 728 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
16. Id. at 728 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In a classic remark that exhibited the whole
distance between his own approach to constitutional adjudication and that of others for
whom such matters were mere details at best, Harlan began his expression of reproach in
Burton in this way:
The Court's opinion, by a process of first undiscriminatingly throwing together
various factual bits and pieces and then undermining the resulting structure by
an equally vague disclaimer... leave[s] completely at sea just what it is in this
record that satisfies the requirement of "state action" [without which the
majority's result cannot constitutionally be obtained].
Id.; see also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 322 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating
that the opinion of the majority "substitutes for the comparatively clear and concrete tests
of state action a catch-phrase approach as vague and amorphous as it is far-reaching").
Justice Harlan is sometimes extolled for his important opinion for the Court in
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (confirming and protecting a
First Amendment right of political association). One may well agree, as I do, that this is
a seminal case and an enduring opinion. Even so, one should also note that in the balance
of the Warren Court's cases on this very subject, overall, Justice Harlan was more often
than not in dissent. See, e.g., Dombrowsld v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 498 (1965) (Harlan,
I., dissenting); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 457 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investig. Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 576 (1963) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 496 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
17. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
18. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
19. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
20. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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Arizona.2 Even now, a leading casebook identifies Miranda as "probably
the most famous and controversial Warren Court criminal procedure
case."' And indeed, who has not heard of "Mirandizing" an arrestee?
So, perhaps it will be fruitful to take an additional look here.
But Justice Harlan dissented in Miranda,' as he dissented also in
Mapp v. Ohio,' as well as in Fay v. Noia. And he also dissented in
Griffin v. Illinois.' Even in Gideon, in which Harlan concurred, the
ease of the Warren Court's passage-a quick passage so characteristic of
the Warren Court's overall work-was not acceptable to Justice Harlan.27
For Harlan, the correct doing of constitutional law required a certain
turning of squarer corners.' In terms of particular outcomes, in any
event, judged by these cases, his position cannot qualify him as a major
contributing figure to the expansion of criminal procedure rights in the
grand era of the Warren Court.
D. A Downside Sampler of Freedom of Speech,
Press, and Religion
Having briefly canvassed three other famous categories of Warren
Court reforms, we shall turn to the last readily identifiable category of
fundamental liberty in progressive ferment during the Warren Court
era-the great liberties of the First Amendment, especially freedom of
speech and of the press. Consider Barenblatt v. United States,29 Wood

21. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
22. WiLLAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CoNSTITUTIoNAL LAW: CASES--COMMENTS-

QUESTIONS 307 (6th ed. 1986).
23. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
24. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 672 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan accepted the exclusionary

rule as constitutionally grounded in Fourth Amendment cases, but distinguished state
procedures as governed by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause instead.
25. Fay, 372 U.S. at 448 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

26. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 29 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353, 360 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (also involving indigents on appeal).
27. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 349 (Harlan, J., concurring).
28. See, for example, the discussion of the Burton case, supra note 16. In Gideon,
Justice Harlan began his concurrence in the following way: "I agree that Belts v. Brady
should be overruled, but consider it entitled to a more respectful burial than has been
accorded .

. . ."

Gideon, 372 U.S. at 349.

See also Harlan's careful address in due

process terms in the indigent access to divoree case, rejecting the larger equal protection
rationale, in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971), and his careful concurrence
in the wiretap case overruling Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
29. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
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v. Georgia,' Time, Inc. v. Hill,31 United States v. Robel,32 inker v.
Des Moines School District,33 and New York Times Co. v. United
States,3 -- in not one of these cases was Justice Harlan obviously "on the
side of" free speech.
In the first major Supreme Court First Amendment case of this series,
Barenblatt v. United States, 35 in 1958, he joined the majority to be sure;
but in that case, the free speech claim actually lost. In each of these other
major Warren Court free speech cases, the majority held in favor of the
First Amendment claim, but Justice Harlan did not. So, as to these, his
views were less "on the side" of free speech than those of the majority.
In the last of these cases, the famous Pentagon Papers case, in 1971, Earl
Warren was no longer Chief Justice so it was no longer literally the era
of the Warren Court. But even as of that late year, beyond the fringe of
the Warren Court (and its idea of progress), Justice Harlan was in dissent
against the First Amendment claim that had prevailed.'
And so, too, things appear to have gone with respect to the
neighboring First Amendment clause on the free exercise of religion. In
the critical case decided by the Court in 1963 that fundamentally rewrote
Free Exercise Clause doctrine,37 whereas Justice Brennan wrote for a
Warren Court majority in holding that the First Amendment required
unemployment compensation to be paid from tax-collected funds for
persons refusing work that conflicted with their day of religious
observance, Harlan filed an emphatic dissent."8 In his view, it was quite
impossible to see how the Free Exercise Clause compelled such a subsidy,
despite what the majority said.39 So, here again, one may say that he was

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

370
385
389
393
403
360

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

375 (1962).
374 (1967).
258 (1967).
503 (1969).
713 (1971).
at 109.

36. To be sure, Justice Harlan did not hold that the government was as yet entitled to
an injunction to suppress publication of the purloined Pentagon Papers. Rather, his position
was, as the court of appeals had held, that the district court had been provided an
insufficient opportunity to enable the government to make the extraordinary showing that
Harlan agreed the First Amendment required it to make, in order to succeed as it possibly
might. See New York 7imes, 403 U.S. at 755-56.
37. See Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
38. See id. at 418 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
39. See id. at 423. In a significant number of additional First Amendment religionspecific accommodation cases, as in Sherbert, Justice Harlan was more rigorous in facing
the difficulties of reconciling the results with Establishment Clause doctrine than was the
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far less generous than others on the Court at the time in his construction
of the relevant constitutional clause.
Of course this brief review of thirty or so of the most notable
decisions from the era of the Warren Court underreports the whole work,
of that Court during Justice Harlan's tenure. Even so, it is surely
sufficient to help remind one concretely of specific positions Justice
Harlan held at the time. More than was true of any other Justice of the
same period, in virtually all four categories of the Warren Court's
expansionary constitutional and statutory decisions, despite what has been
left out here, it remains correct that his was the single most frequent voice
in dissent. So what shall one say about that?
I.

"VIRTUE AS PRACTICE"

In his far ranging essay After Virtue,'" Alasdair Macintyre
investigates a view of virtue as "the notion of goods internal to a
practice."41 It is a view one might also identify as easily, and perhaps
better, as the idea of virtue as the quality of professional commitment in
a particular sense. The "goods" internal to a practice, as MacIntyre
helpfully recalls in his provocative essay, are not worldly goods, at least
not in the usual sense, but something else. In the course of explaining the
idea, MacIntyre offers the following explanation and comparison:
Consider the example of a highly intelligent seven-year-old child
whom I wish to teach to play chess, although the child has no
particular desire to learn the game. The child does however have
a very strong desire for candy and little chance of obtaining it. I
therefore tell the child that if the child will play chess with me
once a week I will give the,child 500 worth of candy; moreover
I tell the child that I will always play in such a way that it will be
difficult, but not impossible, for the child to win and that, if the
child wins, the child will receive an extra 500 worth of candy.
Thus motivated the child plays and plays to win. Notice however

prevailing Supreme Court majority at the time. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm. of New
York, 397 U.S. 664, 696-97 (1970) (Opinion of Harlan, J.). Harlan's view in this case
was that property tax exemption of religiously held property is consistent with the
Establishment Clause only on the assumption that other kinds of nonprofit ideological
groups are treated the same way. See also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 357-58
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring), where Harlan stated that exemption from military training
and combatant service provided by Congress for religious conscientious objectors is valid
only if all other conscientious objectors are treated as similarly exempt.
40. ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1981).
41. Id. at 175.
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that, so long as it is the candy alone which provides the child
with a good reason for playing chess, the child has no reason not
to cheat and every reason to cheat, provided he or she can do so
successfully. But, so we may hope, there will come a time when
the child will find in those goods specific to chess, in the
achievement of a certain highly particular kind of analytical skill,
strategic imagination and competitive intensity, a new set of
reasons, reasons now not just for winning on a particular
occasion, but for trying to excel in whatever way the game of
chess demands. Now if the child cheats, he or she will be
defeating not me, but himself or herself.4'
"But, so we may hope, there will come a time when the child will find in
those goods specific to chess, . . . a new set of reasons"' sufficient in
themselves to abstain from "cheating," even when (and one wants to
emphasize this particularly) he or she can do so successfully," or even
when doing so successfully generates external goods lying outside the
immediate practice itself.'3 Importantly, MacIntyre adds an observation
to this suggestion of virtue as a certain kind of practice. He declares that
"[tihose who lack the relevant experience are incompetent thereby as
judges of internal goods."4 One must have an experience in working
within, I suppose he means, to know virtue as practice. Justice John
Marshall Harlan assuredly did reflect that experience, and it is by the
character of his practice that so many-by no means persons of the same
view on the outcome of particular cases in which he wrote-came to
believe strongly in the integrity of his work.
This imagery of "virtue as practice" is not captured in case outcomes,
as in merely asking who won. Nor, for that matter, is it caught in
supposing that virtue in practice is captured in one's resolve as a judge to
fulfill the familiar maxim, justitia fiat, coelum ruat. To "let justice be
done though the heavens fall" (which is how this familiar maxim roughly
translates), is not virtue as practice, but rather simply a commitment to do
what the maxim declares-to do whatever it is that one thinks to be

42. Id. at 175-76.
43. Id.
44. For example, even when no one will know (indeed, so far as outsiders can see,
all the proper rules of chess are at all times being strictly met).
45. Whether the "external goods" be those secured to the chess player as a chess
player (as to be world renown) or to the chess player in some other way (as a great
champion of others, for example, as to have all the "candy" that comes consequential to
winning put into a trust account for the benefit of others and not for himself or
herself-that is, impersonal external goods).
46. MACINTYRE, supra note 40, at 176.
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"justice." It is, moreover, a thoroughly apocalyptic vision of a judge's
role, a vision John Marshall Harlan eschewed. It implicitly maintains that
justice (or rather that which one deems to be justice) always comes first,
thus everything else comes second-including such lesser matters as truth.
This, however, plainly was not Justice Harlan's view in his practice of
constitutional law during his sixteen years on the Supreme Court of the
United States.47 The truth, rather, mattered much to Harlan, or so at
least I believe it did, as do others who have likewise studied his work."s
The truth was for John Marshall Harlan not a subordinate clause to
the judge's oath; it was not a merely quondam thing to be given its due
only if congenial to "justice," but not otherwise. Neither was the truth to

be captured in merely ingenious or merely plausible-but fictive-readings

of constitutional clauses or articles.49 The truth, indeed, has nothing to do

47. For an elaboration on this paragraph, see William Van Alstyne, Notes on a
Bicentennial Constitution, Partff: Antinomial Choices and the Role of the Supreme Court,
72 IOWA L. REv. 1281 (1987).
48. See, e.g., sources cited supra note *.
49. In this conference, Professor Ackerman contrasts what he calls "independent
constitutionalism" with what he calls "common law constitutionalism." Bruce Ackerman,
The Common Law Constitution of John Marshall Harlan, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 5
(1991). He attributes the latter as more of a piece with Harlan, but faults Harlan on that
account, commending "independent constitutionalism" as the better vision-less staid, more
dynamic, more liberal, and more liberating as surely it is. In defense of "independent
constitutionalism," moreover, Professor Ackerman observes how it can serve both to (a)
expand processes of democratic majoritarianism, and (b) expand entrenched rights against
majorities, at one and the same time. See id. at 11-25. As always, when Professor
Ackerman writes on this theme as he has so impressively, he does an excellent job in
making his point. Choosing examples from the Warren Court, he shows how "independent
constitutionalism" was pro-democratic in several respects, such as in the invalidation of the
Virginia poll tax, and he is likewise able to draw on a number of other Warren Court
decisions expanding the field of entrenched rights. See id. at 11-20. So, all is well ...
except perhaps for a niggling matter or two.
An alternative (to Ackerman) in the manner of either expanding democratic processes
beyond those already provided for by the Constitution, or expanding the list of rights and/or
liberties beyond those provided for by the Constitution, is found in the Constitution itself.
Come to think of it, this alternative (rather than "independent constitutionalism") is all that
the Constitution provides and has had a fair bit of use. For example, the proposal and
ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, and so, too, the proposal and ratification of the
Nineteenth Amendment, and so, too, the Twenty-third, the Twenty-fourth, and the Twentysixth Amendments as well-each and all expanded the participating body politic. And each
is quite express and quite concrete. Come to think of it, this is also how several important
entrenched personal rights became established: by amending the Constitution. Come to look
at it close up in contrast, Professor Ackerman's agenda of "independent constitutionalism"
is but a felicitous restatement of a most familiar Ackerman theme: the encouragement of
judicial flexibility in lieu of amendments (of participation and of protection) by decisional
fiat-without proposal or ratification pursuant to Article V.
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with facile things. It likewise has less affinity for those who, remembering

the future, can at once so easily therefore also "imagine" the past.Y' For
the quality of the example Harlan provided of virtue as practice in this
regard, I do not know of a judge whom it is more of a privilege to pay an
admiring tribute to than to John Marshall Harlan.
But however one might try, having said just this much, one cannot in
a short paper-probably not even in an endless paper-convince anyone
that Justice Harlan actually warrants this special praise. And I certainly do

not mean to suggest.that the fact that Harlan was in dissent in a large
number of leading decisions of the Warren Court somehow per se

establishes his virtue-as though by innuendo against the Warren Court
one thereby means to praise Harlan. I mean no such thing at all.

Moreover; laying aside any claim of that sort, I have no means finally to
persuade anyone of Harlan's good example of virtue as practice. Rather,

if it comes, it comes simply as a conclusion one will reach; if at all, I
suppose, ultimately only by way of one's own abiding impression of
Justice Harlan, after doing the best one can in devoting quite a long time
in trying to take the measure of the same things he and others worked on,

and in coming to that task without illusion or predisposition, so far as one
can manage to do. Here, I can but suggest a few particular examples that

seem to me most helpful in taking the measure of John Marshall Harlan
during his years on the Supreme Court, as a judge who represented virtue

as practice. So, all too briefly, let us give it a try. We do so in a brief

review of but four cases in which Justice Harlan wrote several of his most

interesting opinions, each selected for review in order to make a particular
point, to be fitted within an overall assessment at the end.51

To call this judicial technique "independent constitutionalism," however, is at least
appropriate, albeit perhaps more so than Professor Ackerman intends. It envisions a
Supreme Court busily making constitutional changes quite "independent" of the Constitution
and quite as it thinks best. It will operate (as it sometimes already has operated) much in
the manner of Hans Christian Andersen and The Emperor's New Clothes. Within the new
parable "the Constitution" is the Emperor. The Court then tells us from time to time, just
how perfect the Emperor looks (he merely looks a bit naked, as it were, to us). But I surely
agree that Justice Harlan can be faulted (if fault it be) for not giving himself as readily as
others to this often personally self-gratifying and sometimes even highly rewarding, and
thoroughly constructive community fraud. Perhaps, moreover, even as Professor Ackerman
implies, some who served with Harlan thought this entirely appropriate, and accordingly
declared "Behold!" Justice Harlan did not usually exclaim "Behold." Rather, in his quiet,
professioral manner, he was more likely to say: "Behold what?"
50. See supra note 3.
51. The examples are taken from eases involving particular parts of the Bill of Rights,
rather than other areas of constitutional review, simply in keeping with the focus of this
panel on that portion of Harlan's work.
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A. Cohen v. California
Decided in 1971, the Cohen52 case belies the expectation one might
otherwise have were one's impression based only on the frequency of
Harlan's dissents in the general run of decisions of the Warren Court, that
he must have taken a narrow measure of constitutional review. To the
contrary, as illustrated by Cohen, Justice Harlan's understanding of

principles of generous construction of constitutional clauses was fully
equal to Justice Marshall's own approach in matters of constitutional

adjudication 53 -in this instance, an understanding applied to the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment. In Cohen, moreover, Harlan's

opinion drew insights from the very fact of Cohen's rude language,I
rather than distancing himself from it as the dissent chose to do.55
Cohen's "immature antic"' (as the dissent described it) actually went to
the most divisive political issue of the time, namely, the war in Vietnam
and the military draft that sustained it. In the critical passages of his
opinion for the Court, understanding the setting exactly, Justice Harlan
picked up the point and wrote:

[I]mportant to our conclusion[ ] is the constitutional backdrop
against which our decision must be made. The constitutional
52. 403 U.S, 15 (1971).
53. Specifically, clauses in the Constitution carry a presumption of general utility and
of more permanent principle than do statutes or rules of common law. The latter provide
mutable, provisional "answers" to some perceived problem addressed by legislative
resolution which may or may not prove serviceable but in any event are alterable by the
same politics that generated them. They may, but need not, convey any large principle or
philosophy. Constitutional provisions, however, presumptively address matters at a more
enduring level of principle and concern, and should be treated accordingly-with that
perspective in full view. See Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518,
627-50 (1819); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406-07 (1819).
54. The rude language was this: Fuck the draft. It was lettered onto the jacket Paul
Cohen wore when arrested in the corridor of the Los Angeles courthouse for breach of the
peace. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16.
55. Justices Blackmun and Black, and Chief Justice Burger, dissented in Cohen. They
did so in a cursory dissent by Blackmun characterizing Cohen's expression as an "absurd
and immature antic... mainly conduct and little speech," in their view a vulgarity easily
outweighed by considerations of public decorum and public peace. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 27
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
56. Id.
57. The "conclusion" was that the conviction for breach of the peace, as affirmed in
the state court of appeals, must be reversed. Id. at 24.
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right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as
diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public
discussion ....
To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may
often appear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive
utterance. These are, however, within established limits, in truth
necessary side effects of the broader enduring values which the
process of open debate permits us to achieve. That the air may at
times seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense not a
sign of weakness but of strength....

S [W]ords are often chosen as much for their emotive as
their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the
Constitution while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual
speech has little or no regard for that emotive function which
practically speaking, may often be the more important element of
the overall message to be communicated....
...

[W]e cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can

forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of
suppressing ideas in the process. 5'
I do not think Cohen needs a great deal of comment, even two decades
removed from its inscription. The appreciation of First Amendment core
principles is represented as straightforwardly in Harlan's opinion in Cohen
as in the best opinions decades earlier by Holmes and Brandeis. And
Harlan was surely insightful in seeing "not a sign of weakness but of
strength"59 in the verbal cacophony of which he wrote. Harlan's modest
reminder of the "emotive" force of protected speech, too, is much more
than an afterthought. Just two summers ago, eighteen years after Cohen,
the point was brought back when flag-burning Gregory Johnson prevailed
in the Supreme Court partly on the strength of what Harlan wrote in
Cohen.' In Tiananmen Square, in this same summer two years ago, in
contrast with Cohen, there was assuredly no quarter given for immature
antics or emotive expressions of political dissent. Far from it. There was
instead the ultimate "decorum" of death. By any fair measure, Cohen was
not simply a small matter about a vulgar antic as Justice Blackinun
suggested in dissent. It was, rather, a case about political freedom, as
Harlan understood.
58. Id. at 24-26.
59. Id. at 25.
60. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); see also United States v.
Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990) (a reprise of the Johnson case).
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B. Poe v. Ullman and Griswold v. Connecticut
The related prior point meant to be illustrated here is that Harlan's
Poe6 and Griswold' opinions (a) provide a further report of a principle
of generous construction, but (b) at the same time also display an
understanding that all constitutions, including our own, are necessarily
ethnocentric, much as Holmes had understood as well.' And Harlan
carefully indicates an intention to abide by that remembrance in the useful

61. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, I., dissenting).
62. 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
63. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
I think the word "liberty," in the Fourteenth Amendment, is perverted when it
is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be
said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed
would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the
traditions of our people and our law.
Id. (emphasis added). The "unless" clause in Holmes's opinion furnishes the occasion for
the judicial checking function according to the Constitution. The reference is not a universal
one, moreover, but midrange and culturally specific (thus the "ethnocentric" boundary
reference in administering substantive due process review). "Marriage," as a special estate
of privacy, may well meet this test against certain intrusions, but even then the term itself
carries a boundary as it were-i.e., "marriage" as traditionally understood. For Holmes,
no doubt polygamous marriage, even assuming it had or now has a rock solid foundation
in some other culture, as it may well have, would not be understood as such in this one.
Accordingly, the idea of raising an "equal protection" entitlement for plural, as for
monogamous, "marriage" would not work; not because eminently reasonable persons
cannot be found to find solace and nurture equally in polygamous relationships as in
monogamous relationships, but because it cannot be found equally entrenched in protection
ascribable to any existing real clause, whether of substantive due process or otherwise, in

the Constitution as is.
Compare with this discussion, Justice Harlan's similarly constrained observations in
Poe:
The right of privacy most manifestly is not an absolute. Thus, I would not
suggest that adultery, homosexuality, fornication and incest are immune from
criminal enquiry, however privately practiced....
Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the State
forbids altogether, but the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an
essential and accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an institution which
the State not only must allow, but which always and in every age it has fostered
and protected. It is one thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid
extra-marital sexuality altogether, or to say who may marry, but it is quite
another when, having acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies inherent in
it, it undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal law the details of that
intimacy.
Poe, 367 U.S. at 552-53.
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opinions he wrote.' The authenticity of adjudication in respect to cases
such as Poe and Griswold was thus expressly checked-by Harlan--in
taking due care in crafting his opinions neither to neglect the informing
strength of the institution and tradition he drew upon ("marriage") nor to
exaggerate it, thus leaving the law freer beyond the identifiable zone. So,
it seems to me that Harlan was persuasive in his opinion but persuasive
partly because he was also careful, however, not to embrace anything

beyond that which he could show strong support for by a rigorous test. If
that is so, as I think it is, then Harlan would most likely have voted with
the majority in Bowers v. Hardwick,' and it seems to me a virtual
certainty that he would have been amazed at, and would have rejected,

Justice Brennan's "equal protection" argument in Eisenstadt v. Baird.'

64. See the excerpt from Harlan's opinion supra note 63. By much the same test,
moreover, "marriage" itself is understood in a particular way within this opinion:
monogamous (not polygamous), and heterosexual (not homosexual). Expectations that
Harlan would find satisfactory substantive due process or equal protection leverage to
judicially remake the constitutionally protected array of "personal intimacy" choices of the
less culture-bounded range that authors such as David Richards or Kenneth Karst would
encourage of the Court, would surely be altogether misplaced. See generally Kenneth L.
Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980) (advocating a
presumptive freedom of intimate association encompassing all close and familiar personal
relationships comparable, in some significant way, to a marriage or family relationship);
David A.J. Richards, ConstitutionalLegitimacy and ConstitutionalPrivacy, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 800 (1986) (criticizing the Court's failure to extend the constitutional right of privacy
to consensual homosexual relationships).
65. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
66. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). In Eisenstadt, the Court held a criminal prohibition on the
distribution of contraceptives to an unmarried person to be a denial of equal protection of
such a person vis-a-vis a married person. Justice Brennan's odd efforts here begin in the
following way: "If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons
cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally
impermissible." Id. at 453. Really? Nothing in Harlan's opinion in Poe or in Griswold
provides any foundations for such a claim as Justice Brennan asserted here. Indeed, the
opposite would be true. If it is the case that the state may not forbid persons from having
sexual intercourse even within marriage, does it follow that it would be "equally
impermissible" to disallow fornication-sexual intercourse without marriage? If so, why
is that? But unless it would be equally impermissible, why, then, would a ban on
contraceptive access for an unmarried person stand or fall according to the constitutionality
of such a restriction as applied in respect to married persons, acting within marriage? If the
restriction on distributing contraceptive devices is a restriction against distribution to those
whose most standard use of such devices would be to commit a crime (fornication), the
restriction would prima facie seem to pass every reasonable test of constitutional scrutiny,
whatever the rights of married persons acting within marriage may be. Perhaps such a
statute might still fail on some other account, but one is not likely to find anything in
Eisenstadt v. Baird to discover why that is so. The Court's opinion is, in any case, utterly
"unHarlanlike," but then Justice Harlan was no longer on the Court. It is just another
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Assuming it to be so, moreover, there is no reason to believe that Justice
Harlan would have acted from any animus for the value of such rights as
were sought to be claimed in either Bowers or Eisenstadt. Rather, he
would have acted simply from his informed inability to reinvent the
clauses relied upon by Brennan in each of these cases.
C. Roth v. United States and Alberts v. California
These two cases were treated as of a single piece by the Supreme
Court, but they were distinct for Harlan. In Roth, involving an act of
Congress, the First Amendment was directly and fully at stake.67 In
Alberts, a state statute was all that was involved, to be assessed under the
Fourteenth Amendment.' Harlan emphasized the lesser consequences of
state laws on freezing the national status quo of attitudes toward acceptable
obscenity and on flexibility, change, and variation, than when acts of
Congress presume to lay down the heavy regime of a single flat, national,
criminal law-a law pre-empting what may well be the more permissive
attitude in some locales and pre-empting, too, for all practical purposes,
whatever additional protections state supreme court Justices might find (as
currently in Oregon) in state constitutional free speech provisions. In Roth,
moreover, Harlan rightly noted that the federal interest was marginal to
begin with; he properly pointed out that "Congress has no substantive
power over sexual morality."' The thematic point meant to be added
here is to note the continuing awareness of federalism interests
characteristic of Harlan's more subtle approach-less procrustean dogma,
more care, more nuance, more attention to differences in text, in specific
history, and in effect. Again, the point is not meant to be ponderous, but
in his taking care not to hold (rather cavalierly, as Brennan did?) that
"obscenity" is somehow just a category excluded from all conventional
free speech protection, there is in Harlan a seriousness of thought and an
awareness that notices relationships among parts of the Constitution as
well.
D. Sherbert v. Verner
Rejecting the free exercise claim, and thus dissenting in this case,
Harlan came directly to terms with a related clause the majority did not
reason he is much missed.
67. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 479 (1957) (consolidation of Roth and
Alberts, sustaining an anti-obscenity act of Congress and an anti-obscenity act of the
California legislature, respectively).
68. See id. at 479-80.
69. Id. at 504 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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appear to address or even to take care to consider in the course of its
decision favoring the original plaintiff in this case.' Justice Harlan
confronted the implicit Establishment Clause tension that the majority, in
its haste to favor the "deserving" unemployment compensation claimant,
rather blithely brushed over. I have discussed the case in a footnote above,
in relation to two other Establishment Clause-Free Exercise Clause cases
in which Harlan's position also set him apart.71 In each of these, as in
each case we have already examined, he is more attentive to distinctions,
more aware of other principles, other clauses, other cases which, for him,
always needed to be accounted for and given their due. The problem for
Harlan in Sherbert itself can be quickly stated, although I do so here in a
rather simplified way.
Sherbert was not a case in which a harsh conflict existed between a
state law and claims of religious conscience-i.e., a case involving a
statute either requiring a religious person to do something or to forbear
from something contrary to the dictates of their faith. Rather, Sherbert
was a case where insofar as a person might quit a job from the need to
stay home with a young child or even to attend a dying relative, the
unemployment compensation statute of the state provided no benefits, nor
did it so provide for persons quitting a job for religious reasons. In
Sherbert Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, nonetheless produced
a result requiring just such payments from the state fund.' By focusing on
the hardship to Ms. Sherbert in the nonavailability of unemployment
compensation to her upon leaving work when her employer shifted to a
six-day schedule, one day of which (Saturday) her religion told her to
keep holy, the Court described the arrangement as "penalizing" the free
exercise of religion itself. 3 For Justice Harlan, however, this way of
dealing with the case (and its startling neglect to reconcile the Court's own
Establishment Clause cases) would not do. We capture here but a portion
of his able dissent, but it is useful even so:

70. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 421 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
71. See supra note 39.
72. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 410; see also Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment
Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (extending Sherbert to encompass a claimant who is not a
member of an established religious sect, but still holds religious beliefs that prohibit him
from working on Sunday); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, .480 U.S. 136
(1987) (invalidating a state statute that denied benefits to a claimant who was discharged
for refusal to work on her Sabbath); Thomas v. Review Bd.of Ind. Employment See. Div.,
450 U.S. 707 (1981) (applying and extending Sherbert to a statute that disqualified a
claimant who quit his job for religious reasons).
73. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
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Today's decision is disturbing both in its rejection of existing
precedent and in its implications for the future ...
The South Carolina Supreme Court has uniformly applied [its]
law in conformity with its clearly expressed purpose. It has
consistently held that one is not "available for work" if his
unemployment has resulted not from the inability of industry to
provide a job but rather from personal circumstances, no matter
how compelling. . . .[']
In the present case all that the state court has done is to apply
these accepted principles....
... What the Court is holding is that if the State chooses to
condition unemployment compensation on the applicant's
availability for work, it is constitutionally compelled to carve out
an exception-and to provide benefits-for those whose
unavailability is due to their religious convictions. Such a holding
has particular significance in two respects. 75
One of those "two respects," of course, is how to make sense of this
version of the Free Exercise Clause insofar as it does more than exempt
a person from conforming to a law valid as applied to others (the usual
manner in which free exercise claims may be entitled to some recognition
arise, but not at all a question presented by Sherbert), but appears also to
mandate payment of financial assistance specially targeted to persons
identified by religiously motivated action. Our purpose is satisfactorily
served here merely to have noted the question Justice Harlan raised, a
question raising serious Establishment Clause issues frankly not met in the
majority opinion at all.76 And so, just how does one count Justice Harlan
in this case? As a dissent "against" a claim of civil liberty? As a judge,
rather, voting "for" the Constitution?
IV. CONCLUSION
Justice Harlan was a judge who tried remarkably successfully always
to answer for the full integrity of his work on the Supreme Court. His
seriousness of purpose, his conscientiousness, his understanding, his
openness, his courtesy, his skill, his learning, all seem so apparent as one
turns pages, reads, and reflects. Whether one finds in any of this "virtue

74. For example, the case of a claimant leaving ajob to attend a sick or dying relative
and unable to return to work, or a claimant who must care for young children and who, on
that account, leaves a job and is similarly not available to resume work or take another job.
75. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 418-20 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
76. See Everson v. Board of Edue., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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as practice," as Macntyre meant to describe it, perhaps one cannot finally
say. But I believe there was virtue of a rare sort in Justice Harlan. It was
well reflected in his years on the Supreme Court. This law school honors
itself in honoring John Marshall Harlan. He is very greatly missed.

